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Over the last two decades several influential studies have appeared that docu-
ment the rise of  conservatism.1 A common theme in many of  these books is the
diverse constituencies that aided in the conservative ascendancy did not receive
equal attention from conservative politicians. This argument is predominant
when historians look at the influence of  evangelical Christians and supporters of
a free-market economy on conservatism. Republicans spoke out in favor of  out-
lawing abortion and about the need to protect the sanctity of  marriage and the
family—issues of  utmost importance to evangelical Christians—but legislative
accomplishments rarely matched this rhetoric. Instead, politicians like Ronald
Reagan focused on tax cuts and deregulation. In All in the Family, Robert O. Self
offers an alternative view of  the decline of  liberalism and the rise of  conser-
vatism by looking at how matters pertaining to the American family since the
1960s allowed conservative politicians to rise to power.
Self  organizes his book under two similar, yet distinct, conceptions of
the nuclear family from 1964 until 2004. Using ‘the family’ is, of  course, not
something new when it comes to studying the rise of  conservatism.2 However,
in contrast to these other studies, Self ’s exhaustive account delves into how the
social movements of  the 1960s and 1970s weakened the liberal conception of
family, thereby making room for the new view of  the family put forth by conser-
vatives. Whereas the social programs instituted by the New Frontier and the
Great Society sought to remove some of  the roadblocks to forming a nuclear
family and acquiring all of  its trappings, conservatives in the 1970s and beyond
wanted to protect the nuclear family from immoral and totalitarian forces. Self
labels the former efforts “breadwinner liberalism” and the latter attempts
“breadwinner conservatism.”3 While examining the conflicting views of  the
nuclear family offered by liberals and conservatives, Self  also uses this frame-
work to show that the split between so-called “values” voters and advocates of
the free-market did not actually exist. Self  questions the veracity of  separating
the goals and aspirations of  participants of  the culture war—which involved
issues of  gender, sexuality, and family—from the economic programs favored by
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free-market conservatives. Self  contends the distinction between negative
rights—rights that exist because the government chooses not to restrict the
actions of  a particular group or individual—and positive rights—where the gov-
ernment develops laws to prevent injustices from occurring—paralleled the
debates over greater or lesser economic intervention by the government.
Broken into four parts, Self  devotes more than half  of  the book to documenting
the continuous weakening of  breadwinner liberalism as a result of  protests by
gay rights activists, feminists, and civil rights activists. Demands made by women,
homosexuals, and minorities for expanded “rights” resulted in greater freedom
for these groups. At the same time, however, their efforts brought into question
the role of  the breadwinner in the nuclear family. Breadwinner liberalism, as Self
shows, came under attack from all sides during the 1960s.  Liberal social pro-
grams, whether the Social Security and Wagner Act of  the 1930s or the War on
Poverty in the 1960s, for the most part, ignored the contributions of  women in
the workplace, choosing instead to view women as tending to the home.  Such a
gendered perspective created many difficulties for women and came under
increasing scrutiny from feminists.  Likewise, liberal programs that sought to ele-
vate the standing of  African American males in order to strengthen the black
family angered many working-class whites. Conservatives, furthermore, attacked
breadwinner liberalism for not allowing the male to succeed by his own efforts.
As various groups questioned liberalism’s emphasis on the white, male breadwin-
ner, liberalism itself  experienced a decline. The story of  liberalism’s decline is
well known, but by situating this decline in the larger story of  the family, Self ’s
framework shows a direct correlation between how the demand for greater
“rights” led to a conservative ascendancy.
When breadwinner liberalism came under attack, many of  its detrac-
tors, either directly or indirectly, questioned the male-dominated structure of  the
nuclear family. Males had been able to prove their manhood through their role as
the sole money-earner in the nuclear family. In addition to their economic stand-
ing, males also had used heterosexuality as a means to demonstrate their man-
hood. Gay rights activists, known primarily as homophiles prior to the late
1960s, had been demanding greater rights as early as 1950, when they formed
the Mattachine Society. These early homophiles demanded negative rights—
especially the right to do as they chose in private settings. Later activists, embold-
ened by the police actions at Stonewall Inn in New York City in 1969, sought
sexual liberties beyond the private confines of  their homes. This represented,
according to Self, “an entirely new . . . unimagined sexual citizenship” that
threatened manliness and the nuclear family.4 Self  argues the “sexual citizen-
ship” demanded by gay rights activists, as well as other forms of  citizenship that
the various rights movements fought for, played a key role in antagonizing
Americans who, in turn, increasingly looked to conservatism as being better
equipped to deal with their complaints.
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Alternative conceptions of  citizenship, in Self ’s telling of  the rise of
breadwinner conservatism, did the most to bring about the conservative success-
es of  the 1970s and 1980s. In the past, America’s social contract provided bene-
fits—including pensions, healthcare, and employment insurance—only to work-
ing Americans, thereby excluding many women. When the government had pre-
viously offered proposals for government-sponsored childcare, it did so with the
intention of  moving women off  of  welfare and into steady employment. In
1971, however, Walter Mondale (D-MN) and representative John Brademas (D-
IN), put forth the Comprehensive Child Development Act. Describing it as
“quietly revolutionary,” Self  argues that it “redefined the social contract itself,”
by allowing for “social citizenship” rather than “economic citizenship.”5 If
passed, the bill would have greatly enlarged the social contract to include all
women, not only those women with steady work.6 In the end, President Nixon
vetoed the bill over concerns that government-run child care centers would give
government officials too much influence in matters that were out of  the purview
of  the government. Families, conservatives argued, needed to care for their chil-
dren, not some bureaucrat thousands of  miles away.
Expansion of  the parameters of  citizenship encountered tremendous
opposition from conservative activists not only because the citizenship demand-
ed by activists on the left threatened the family, but also because calls for an
enlarged citizenship brought with it the need for “positive” rights. Gay men and
lesbian women had secured the right to privacy in their homes; legal restrictions
on women’s employment had become less common; and women obtained
greater sexual freedom because the government no longer restricted birth con-
trol. These, however, represented “negative” rights since the expansion of  free-
dom came from the removal of  restrictions on activities rather than through
supplementary laws meant to protect these groups from certain abuses.  The
government did not have to go through the much more difficult task of  provid-
ing additional benefits or protections that conservative Americans viewed as
unfair. Once these groups gained greater freedoms, it became clear that their
newly acquired citizenship extended only so far. Women, as one example, could
not achieve “economic citizenship.” The Humphrey-Hawkins full-employment
bill, for instance, ignored welfare dependents and workers stuck in low-paying
part-time jobs. Since mostly women filled these types of  jobs, the Humphrey-
Hawkins bill, the bill’s critics argued, ignored the economic plight of  women.
Coming as it did at the time of  one of  the worst economic downturns since the
Great Depression, the full-employment legislation already faced an uphill battle
as the government looked for ways to break free from its social contract with
American citizens. Women’s groups, realizing the difficulties associated with
obtaining positive rights, put their support behind the bill and suggested only
minimal amendments to the legislation. Positive rights, as Self  demonstrates,
entered the fray just as government officials turned to neoliberalism as a means
of  solving the nation’s ills.
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The various social movements that came together in the 1960s and
1970s increasingly voiced their claims for greater rights based on a common
identity—whether gay, lesbian, woman, black, or Latino. Such “identity politics,”
as these movements are usually described, have received much criticism from all
sides in debates over post-1960s America. Self  does not specifically discuss
“identity politics,” though he does offer one piece of  criticism. The problem
with using identities to make American citizenship more expansive, according to
Self, was that forming groups based on identity to diversify the idea of  citizen-
ship actually led to additional limits on citizenship. Within these identity groups
existed a variety of  sub-identities that took control of  the group’s efforts to
diversify citizenship. Thus male homophiles had to combat heterosexuality, but
lesbians had to do the same with male homophiles, and ethnic groups involved
in the homophile and feminist struggles had to battle racism on top of  the injus-
tices faced by women and gays.
Out of  all the social movements that arose in the period covered in
Self ’s book, perhaps no other experienced as much division as the women’s
movement. As Self  has shown, Second Wave feminists held varied views of
“motherhood.” Working-class women wanted to make it possible for women to
both work outside of  the home and care for their family, so they demanded that
the government provide childcare. Another view of  motherhood, this one
favored by Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem, called for childcare, but also
explained the importance of  males needing to take on more responsibilities at
home. Some feminists even questioned why women would want a career that
often times meant they would have to do demeaning work. The National Welfare
Rights Organization, for instance, viewed motherhood as much more valuable
than low-paid employment. A more radical view of  motherhood provided by
Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone, among others, posited that nuclear families
fostered patriarchal relationships. An additional fragmentation of  the women’s
movement occurred when lesbian feminists began to distinguish their problems
from those of  heterosexual women. These divisions became clear when lesbians
fought for the right to raise their own children following a divorce from their
husband. Citizenship for lesbian mothers required, Self  shows, not only the neg-
ative right of  privacy in the bedroom, but also the positive right of  lesbians to
maintain custody of  their children. In order to illustrate their ability to nurture
their children, many lesbians, going against earlier efforts by feminists, presented
their arguments in a way that situated lesbians within the “traditional” framework
of  motherhood where the mother acted as caregiver and housekeeper.
As its constituency demanded an expanded conception of  citizenship,
liberals inside and outside of  the Democratic Party attempted to chart the best
course to take to achieve such a goal.  According to Self, George McGovern, at
the Democratic Party convention in 1972, strove to find a way to carry out the
activist demands of  the 1960s in a manner that preserved the coalition created
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during the New Deal. Thus, on abortion—an issue which McGovern had only
mildly supported throughout the campaign—the candidate not only allowed
Frances Farenthold, a Texas state legislator, to give a speech decrying govern-
ment interference in women’s lives, but also Missouri delegate Eugene Walsh,
who compared abortion to murder. Likewise, McGovern made the politically
motivated decision to refuse to include any mention of  gay rights in his platform
and left discussion of  the gay rights minority plank until after 4:00 a.m. After the
gay rights activists finally spoke, Ohio delegate Kathleen Wilch took the stage
and linked homosexuality to sexual abuse. The next day Wilch accused a lawyer
from the staff  of  the platform committee of  writing the speech, thereby tying
McGovern to the debacle. McGovern’s disastrous 1972 nominating convention,
Self  claims, signaled “the nation’s circle of  equal citizenship had run into the
reality of  political efficacy.”7 Efforts by activists to make liberals and the
Democratic Party broaden their conception of  the family and breadwinner liber-
alism had, as the 1972 convention made clear, failed miserably.
Despite the middle-of-the-road approach taken by McGovern at the
1972 Democratic national convention, continued activism by women eventually
led to the revision of  the liberal breadwinner ideal. According to Self, the White
House Conference on Families report, based on conferences held in Los
Angeles, Minneapolis, and Baltimore in 1980, and the International Women’s
Year National Plan of  Action, which was based on discussions held at the IFW
Conference in Houston in 1977, “embodied a new liberal vision” of  citizenship
and family in America.8 Though still leaning towards the family with a hetero-
sexual male as the sole breadwinner, the report put a greater emphasis on inclu-
sivity, especially as it related to race, gender, and sexual preference. Self ’s asser-
tion that the two reports represented an alternative liberal construct of  citizen-
ship and family illustrates the continued existence of  liberalism despite the con-
servative revival of  the 1970s. Nonetheless, while the liberal conception of  fami-
ly—labeled the “adaptive family” by Self  to signify those families that did not
follow the usual form of  a nuclear family with the male as head of  the house-
hold—seemed to be more widespread, the conservatives “archetypal family”
won the “rhetorical war” that mattered so much in politics.9
A major reason for the conservative resurgence of  the 1980s, Self
argues, was the cooperation between “family values” conservatives and fiscal
conservatives. Breadwinner conservatism, according to Self, allowed Phyllis
Schlafly’s “contented housewives” and Nixon’s “hard hats” to enter into “politi-
cal matrimony.”10 Anti-Equal Rights Amendment forces claimed that the market
had made it difficult for women to find jobs and, therefore, women should cele-
brate and do everything possible to preserve their priceless roles as mothers and
homemakers. The “wife,” these activists claimed, needed to appreciate the diffi-
cult work her husband did in order to maintain his role as breadwinner while
enduring constant attacks by the government, non-whites, and hippies. 
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Contrary to popular understanding the differences between the “val-
ues” of  conservatives and fiscal conservatives did not prevent the two sides
from working together. To illustrate the common goals between the two groups
of  conservatives, Self  discusses the “Unity 81” campaign conducted by conser-
vatives. During “Unity 81,” the name given to the inaugural Grassroots Pro-Life
Conference, Howard Phillips detailed his plans to “defund the left” by stopping
government funding of  programs associated with abortion and families. Title X
of  the 1970 Public Health Services Act, for instance, received much criticism
because it provided Planned Parenthood Federation of  America with thirty to
forty million dollars per year. While Planned Parenthood performed various
services, it’s most controversial activities included abortions and abortion coun-
seling for teenagers. Federal monies continued to go to Planned Parenthood, but
conservatives succeeded in forcing the organization to separate its abortion facil-
ities from its family planning programs. Self  provides another example of  coop-
eration between “values” voters and voters concerned primarily with fiscal issues
by discussing Reagan’s Working Group on the Family. This group, whose partici-
pants included Clarence Thomas, William Kristol, and Jo Ann Gasper, who lost
her job as deputy secretary of  Health and Human Services because of  her role
in keeping federal funding from going to Planned Parenthood, wrote The
Family: Preserving America’s Future. The report, published in 1986, called for
tax credits for families with children and an end to federal programs that in any
way supported homosexuality and teenage sex.
Self  recognizes that despite the unifying principles of  “family values”
and fiscal conservative activists, the former could not celebrate any crowning
achievements during Reagan’s presidency. Still, Self  argues that “family values”
and evangelical conservatives succeeded in making “American citizenship” less
about “rights” and more about “government provision,” or what the govern-
ment would have to “provide” for these rights to be secured.11 Additionally,
these conservatives made morality the sole issue, thereby making the left’s views
on citizenship, family, and government aid seem far more threatening than they
had previously been. Though evangelical voters could not celebrate many legisla-
tive or legal victories during Reagan’s presidency, a less visible but far more fun-
damental change occurred.  Family values, Self  contends, made it easier for
neoliberal policies to take hold since “family values could flourish only with a
weak government that absented itself  from both the market and the ‘private’
domain of  family morality.”12
The fact remains, however, that Reagan’s policies did not offer much of
anything to evangelical and family values voters. Neither did Republicans in the
first half  of  the 1990s when, for instance, Newt Gingrich’s Contract with
America seemed devoid of  religious issues. While the “rhetoric of  cultural war-
fare” remained a part of  the Republican Party, politicians never forcefully backed
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the actual policies.13 It is unclear whether Self  would agree with the historian
David T. Courtwright’s assertion that “the moral revolution of  the 1960s became
so entrenched that it defied the most politically successful enemies” due in part
to the economic policies of  Reagan.14
Looking at American society from 1964 until 2004 within the frame-
work of  the nuclear family, particularly how rising demands for greater “rights”
put in peril the breadwinner ideal of  the nuclear family, is ambitious, but Self
pulls it off  brilliantly. The most significant contribution Self  has made is to the
literature on liberalism. More questionable, however, is Self ’s discussion of  what
role the culture war played in America in relation to morality. Self  makes an
extremely convincing case when writing about the impact of  family values on
liberalism and those groups who sought to expand the liberal conception of  the
nuclear family. His argument, though, does not take into account what successes,
if  any, family values conservatives had in actually transforming American society.
Family values conservatives made possible the neoliberal economic policies of
the 1980s, but, beyond politics, can these conservatives claim a victory when it
comes to the structure of  families in America? It seems that now, more than
ever before, the nuclear family, if  that term is even useful any longer, is much
more elastic.
In addition to “breadwinning” and “heterosexuality,” “soldiering,”
according to Self, represented a “stable triumvirate” of  “American manhood.”15
During the Vietnam War, draft resisters, military deserters, drug-addicted sol-
diers, antiwar activists, and soldiers accused of  horrific atrocities brought into
question the previously assumed relationship between being a soldier and man-
hood. Running against Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election, Ronald
Reagan, supported by his neoconservative advisors, portrayed the president as
weak in the aftermath of  the Soviet Union’s invasion of  Afghanistan and the
continuing hostage situation in Iran. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan prom-
ised to roll-back communism wherever it sought to spread its ideology, especially
in Latin America. The previous July, the Sandinista National Liberation Front,
after 18 years of  battling Somoza’s forces, succeeded in forcing Anastasio
Somoza—whose dictatorial actions as president of  Nicaragua went unnoticed by
American officials—out of  power.
Once in office, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17
on November 11, 1981, which provided $19 million for the Central Intelligence
Agency to create the Contras, an anti-Sandinista force in Nicaragua. Unable to
prod Congress into funding the Contras, the Reagan administration turned to
other sources for financial support to aid the anti-Sandinista forces. Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North led the administration’s efforts to seek financial backing
from foreign nations and wealthy Americans. Beginning in April 1986, North,
despite securing over thirty million dollars from Saudi Arabia and $10 to $20
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million from private U.S. citizens like Joseph Coors and singer Pat Boone, pro-
posed a plan whereby weapons would be sold to Iran with the profits from these
sales going to fund the Contras. The Reagan administration’s methods came to
light in late 1986, which led the Senate to hold investigative hearings the follow-
ing year.16 Though dropped in the early 1990s as a result of  the immunity given
to him during his congressional testimony, Congress charged North with twelve
felony accounts. Comparisons between North and Calley immediately began
swirling, but, according to Self, North, even more than the controversial Calley,
“fully embodied a forthright military manhood.”17 Reagan once again popular-
ized the image of  America as a freedom-loving nation that sought to extend its
democratic institutions to the rest of  the world.
Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy maneuvers undoubtedly restored the
linkage between the military and manhood, but not without reigniting wide-
spread opposition among certain segments of  the American populace. Historians
view Ronald Reagan’s election as the culmination of  the conservative ascendency
and evidence of  the domination of  conservative ideals. While this view still pre-
vails, several historians have explored those events of  the 1980s that do not fit
into the conservative paradigm, particularly in relation to Reagan’s Latin
American policies, AIDS, and apartheid.18 Smaller than the antiwar protests
against the Vietnam War, opponents of  Reagan’s Central America policies,
nonetheless, organized several impressive protests and demonstrations in the
1980s. In A Call to Conscience, Roger Peace has provided an informative account
of  the campaign against Reagan’s Nicaraguan policy by looking at the activities
of  various organizations in the United States. Though Peace took part in the
protests against Reagan, he takes a scholarly approach to the material that he is
writing on.
Peace begins his account by offering a brief  history of  previous
American interventions in the region that date back to the early twentieth centu-
ry. In doing this, Peace seeks to connect the work of  earlier anti-interventionists
to the activists in the 1980s that he writes about. When Calvin Coolidge sent U.S.
Marines to Nicaragua without the consent of  Congress in late 1926, the
Fellowship of  Reconciliation and the American Friends Service Committee
helped organize a trip led by peace activist John Nevin Sayre and other
Americans to Nicaragua to meet with the general of  the Liberal faction there,
Augusto César Sandino. Though these Americans failed to secure a meeting with
Sandino, Sayre left Santino’s wife a letter expressing his support for Nicaragua
and his disdain for U.S. imperialism. Anti-interventionists opposed the U.S. inter-
vention because Congress had not authorized the action; the evidence used to
show that Mexico had supplied weapons to Sandino’s troops was faulty; and
non-military means had not been employed first. Anti-Contra protestors, Peace
argues, later used these same arguments in the 1980s.
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After concluding his discussion of  American-Nicaraguan relations
through the middle 1980s, Peace provides a general overview of  the arguments
employed by activists against Reagan’s policies. Peace discerns three general argu-
ments used by activists during the 1980s. Many of  these activists opposed
Reagan’s policies by working to shed light on the administration’s unlawful
actions.  The Reagan administration ignored both Boland amendments and their
restrictions on sending funds to Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista forces and Executive
Order 12333, which made it illegal for the U.S. to take part in any foreign assassi-
nations. Peace argues such arguments were questionable since anti-Contra
activists themselves often found it necessary to break the law through civil dis-
obedience.  Efforts to portray the Nicaraguan war as another Vietnam fared no
better.  Widespread public opposition to Reagan’s Central American policies
never materialized because U.S. troops had not, nor would they ever be, called
into action to invade Nicaragua. Also, the success of  the Grenada invasion in
October 1983 made Americans more receptive towards military interventions.
The most articulate and successful argument voiced by anti-Contra activists,
according to Peace, involved a demand for negotiations, which had the benefit of
large-scale support from Europeans and Latin Americans.
One of  the greatest strengths of  Peace’s book is that he analyzes the
activities of  a variety of  organizations that up until this point have remained
invisible in the literature on the Central America peace movement. In the
process of  describing the various activities carried out by these organizations,
Peace distinguishes between more leftist and moderate groups, as evidenced by
the group’s position on the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). More
than any other organization, according to Peace, the Nicaragua Network offered
the most “uncritical view” of  the FSLN and accepted much of  the latter’s pro-
nouncements of  popularity among the Nicaraguan people.”19 The Committee in
Solidarity with the People of  El Salvador (CISPES) also offered its unequivocal
support of  the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El
Salvador, but CISPES made a conscious effort to refrain from sounding too rev-
olutionary, which is why it highlighted its educational purposes. In comparison to
CISPES, the Religious Task Force on Central America did not promote the
efforts of  the FMLN. Nonetheless, the two groups worked well together since
both emphasized the promotion of  human rights and their opposition to the
U.S. funding of  the Contra rebels.
While Peace covers the protests and demonstrations undertaken by
anti-Contra war activists, he also highlights the many educational and electoral
activities of  these organizations, thus illustrating the more moderate tactics used
by antiwar activists.  In a desire to appear respectable, the Interreligious
Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO), which, beginning with Kansas
in September 1983, held Central America Information Weeks  in order to not
appear too radical. As quoted by Peace, the director of  IFCO, Lucius Walker
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explained, “We tried to keep it as simple and direct as possible and free of  jar-
gon as possible. We did not use language of  the extreme left.”20 IFCO organized
hundreds of  events in dozens of  communities across the country to educate
Americans about Central America and America’s role in the region.
The Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy’s Central America
Working Group (CAWG) played a leading role in uniting the distinct groups
opposed to Reagan’s foreign policy initiatives. Even the more radical groups, like
the Nicaragua Network and CISPES, worked with CAWG in the hopes of
appearing to fight for singular goals. CAWG influenced members of  Congress
through its relationship with the House Democratic Task Force on Central
America as the two worked together under the leadership of  the task force’s
chairman David Bonior (D-MI). Further evidence of  the close work between the
Central America peace movement and the U.S. Congress was the Countdown ’87
Campaign to End Contra Aid. The campaign included representatives from the
Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, the Nicaragua Network, Witness for Peace,
and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, among others. The purpose of
Countdown ’87 was to pressure and lobby twenty-three members of  the House
of  Representatives and six members of  the Senate who had not yet not firmly
commit to either approving or rejecting aid to the Contras. This persuasion took
the form of  letters, phone calls, meetings between congressmen, and editorials
or advertisements in newspapers. 
In early 1988, Reagan requested $36.25 million over four months for
military and non-military use in Nicaragua. On February 3, 1988, the House
rejected the measure by a vote of  219-211. Six of  the congressmen who
opposed the measure had been included in the list of  the twenty-three congress-
men that Countdown ‘87 entreated to vote no. While two of  these votes came
from newly elected members and another two came from congressmen who had
voted against aid previously, the two other congressmen changed their vote. Yet
Speaker of  the House Jim Wright (D-TX) stopped the passage of  Reagan’s aid
package by promising to put forward another bill for non-lethal aid to the
Contras. This measure also failed due in part to Republicans who rejected the bill
out of  the belief  that public opinion would soon turn in their favor regarding
military aid. The Nicaragua Network and CISPES opposed the measure but,
according to Robert Borosage, a board member of  the Countdown ’87 cam-
paign, the better-known moderate groups used their greater influence to per-
suade congressmen and activists to accept the compromise.
Though some organizations played a more prominent role in the peace
movement of  the 1980s than others, decentralization prevented any one group
from dominating the actions of  the whole movement. Peace argues that the
decentralized structure of  the movement allowed for differences to exist without
causing the movement to implode. Still, Peace concedes, the lack of  leadership
hurt the movement in a way because it meant that the media could not go to a
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prominent figure and find out what the movement was all about. Secondly, the
lack of  a common periodical, like the disarmament movement’s Nuclear Times,
made the range of  actions undertaken by the Central America movement seem
disconnected and made it difficult to create a “movement identity.”21 Lastly,
Peace contends, a lack of  a national centralized governing body caused disorgan-
ization since national groups and grassroots activists had little to no coordina-
tion. 
A prominent theme throughout Peace’s history of  the anti-Contra war
campaign is that the organizations involved in the peace movement strived to
appear respectable in the eyes of  the American public. While the reasons for
such an attitude might be evident to scholars, Peace could have greatly strength-
ened his account of  the peace movement of  the 1980s if  he had situated these
protests within the larger history of  the peace movement over time. For
instance, how much of  an impact did the violence associated with 1960s antiwar
activists have on activists in the 1980s? Or did the attention on tactics have more
to do with the conservative character of  the era? Besides discussing Reagan’s cre-
ation of  the Office of  Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Peace devotes only minimal attention to the ways in which the conservative envi-
ronment impacted the peace movement of  the 1980s. Nonetheless, Peace’s well-
researched account of  the anti-Contra war campaign provides scholars looking
to expand their analysis beyond Nicaragua an excellent starting point.
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Some of  the most important works include Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment:
Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics (New
York: Free Press, 2000); Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the
GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007);
and Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making
America Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
2 See, for instance, Mary Brennan, Wives, Mothers, and the Red Menace: Conservative
Women and the Crusade against Communism (Boulder, University of  Colorado Press,
2008); Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s
Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Michelle Nickerson,
Mothers of  Conservatism: Women and the Postwar Right (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012). Another account that, like Self, uses the family as repre-
sentative of  a larger occurrence is Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The
American Family and the Fear of  National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill: The
Quark 17_1 draft3_Left History.qxd  13-06-25  2:58 PM  Page 111
112 Mueller
University of  North Carolina Press, 2007.
3 Robert O. Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of  American Democracy Since the
1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 4-5.
4 Ibid., 100.
5 Ibid., 127-129.
6 Historian Daniel Rodgers has illustrated that the shrinking of  the social con-
tract represented only part of  the general movement to a small-scale individual-
ized way of  viewing everything from economics to education. The rising interest
in community organization, among both the Left and the Right, according to
Rodgers, represented a turn away from the expanded citizenship offered after
World War II towards smaller cooperative associations. As a result, the social
contract “shrank imaginatively into smaller, more partial contracts,” fragmenting
society further. See Daniel T. Rodgers, The Age of  Fracture (Cambridge: Belknap
Press, 2011), especially 198 for his analysis of  the social contract.  
7 Self, 275.
8 Ibid., 335.
9 Ibid., 337.
10 Ibid., 297.
11 Ibid., 398.
12 Ibid., 400.
13 Ibid., 404.
14 David T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in a Liberal America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 4-6.
15 Self, 75.
16 As a result of  historians beginning to look at the Cold War from a global per-
spective, a number of  books offer good overviews of  American interventions in
the region, including Nicaragua, during the last years of  the Cold War. See Odd
Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of  Our
Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Greg Grandin, Empire’s
Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of  the New Imperialism (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); and Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
17 Self, 409.
18 See, for instance, Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America
Peace Movement (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1996); Bradford Martin,
The Other Eighties: A Secret History of  America in the Age of  Reagan (New York: Hill
and Wang, 2011); and Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds., The World the Sixties
Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
2003).
19 Roger Peace, A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign (Amherst:
University of  Massachusetts Press, 2012), 69.
20 Peace, 100.
21 Peace, 117.
Quark 17_1 draft3_Left History.qxd  13-06-25  2:58 PM  Page 112
